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This paper focuses on one aspect of long—term labor contracts——
employer—provided pensions——in order to develop a better understanding of
how such contracts affect employment patterns of older workers. Pensions
are one of the few elements of the employment package which explicitly
describe long term agreements between workers and their employers; con-
sequently they offer a unique opportunity to study these agreements. The
present paper combines labor supply and contract theory to examine pension
responses to changes in taxes, Social Security benefits, and the federal
government's recent decision to lift the age of mandatory retirement.
Evidence on a longitudinal sample of pension plans from 1960 to the present
suggests:
(1) During the 1960—70 period, Social Security increases generated
changes in pensions favoring early retirement; and
(2) During the 1970—80 period, some plans reduced private pension
benefits in response to the raising of the mandatory retirement age.
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Inthe last few years analysts interested in long—term worker/firm
relationships have made a number of theoretical advances.'Despite this
volume of theoretical work, empirical analysts have lagged far behind in
examining the form and function of real—world long—term agreements between
workers and firms. The present paper focuses on one aspect of the lifetime
labor contract—-employer—provided pensions——in order to develop a better
understanding of how such contracts operate.
Private pensions are one of the few elements of the employment package
in which employers spell out their long—term promises to employers.
Because written documents containing pension promises are readily avail-
able, it is possible to quantify levels and changes in the value of
employers' promises regarding this important form of deferred compen-
sation.2 In this paper we develop a new longitudinal data set on
defined benefit pension plans covering the twenty—year period between 1960
and 1980, and evaluate how and why employers' pension promises changed
through time. Of special interest are private pension responses to
exogenous changes including Social Security, income and payroll taxes, and
the federal government's decision to lift the age at which mandatory
retirement can he imposed. Determining whether and how pension structures
adapted to these regulatory policies provides unusual insight about the
nature of these long—term contracts.
See Azariadis and Stiglitz (1983) for a survey of the recent theoretical
literature.
2 Detailed information has been provided to workers since thepassageof the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act in 1974 (ERISA); many firms also
produced extremely detailed pension documents since the inception of their
pension plans in the l940s and 1950s.It should be notedat the outset that we do notfocuson the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, which set national stan-
dards for private pension eligibility and vesting provisions, accrual
formulas prior to reaching retirement age, and funding and insurance of
pension benefits. These regulations clearly affected the security of
retirement benefits immediately, but probably did not alter benefit levels
and profiles over the period under study.'
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 1 sketches some of the
key changes in the pension environment attributable to regulatory reforms
over the period 1960—1980. Section 2 outlines the theoretical model used
to predict how pensions responded to such changes in the regulatory
environment. Section 3 presents empirical findings. In a final section
we discuss the implications of the results for contract theory and policy
analysis.
1. jes in the Pension Environment: 1960 to 1980
This section examines three major changes In the pension environment
between 1960 and 1980: mandatory retirement age changes, tax increases,
and Social Security benefit adjustments.
Mandatory retirement has received considerable attention in the labor
economics literature, stemming mainly from the 1978 amendments to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) which raised the permissable
mandatory retirement age from 65 to 70. Considerably less attention was
devoted to the original ADEA of 1967. This Act protected individuals ages
1Because ERISA reduced the riskiness of vested pension benefits, employers
may have an incentive to reduce workers' wage profiles in the long run.
Ehrenberg (1980) finds evidence of a wage—pension risk tradeoff.3
40—65 from employment discrimination; age 65 was selected as the upper
limit because at the time it was the commonly specified age of mandatory
retirement in the private sector. It is interesting to note, however, that
the Supreme Court interpreted the 1967 Act as permitting mandatory retire--
ment prior to age 65 in the special case when the pension plan required it.
The 1978 amendments explicitly disallowed this interpretation of the
original Act, at the same time raising the protected age from 65 to 70.
Initially, economists predicted that the 1978 reform would bring about
changes in compensation aimed at achieving the same result (i.e. retire-
ment at age 65);l since then, however, a few studies have found that
mandatory retirement provisions were often not binding since a majority of
workers retired before age 65.2 The net effect of mandatory retirement
rules on pension structures is thus still open to debate.
The 1960—80 period saw other changes in the pension environment in
addition to the revised mandatory retirement rules. Between 1960 and 1970
income and payroll tax rates rose though real net earnings held their own.
Between 1970 and 1980, in contrast, tax rates continued to rise, and in
addition, the maximum earnings subject to Social Security payroll tax
nearly quadrupled, going from $7800 to $25,900 (in contrast to the slower
growth of $4800 in 1960 to $7800 in 1979). As a result real earnings for
the average worker were only slightly higher in 1980 than in 1970.
Along with changes in taxes came reforms in the way Social Security
benefits were computed. Benefits have always been based on workers'
earnings histories, and as noted above, the maximum earnings recognized for
For example, Lazear (1979), Burkhauser and Quinn (1980).
2 Burkhauser and Quinn (1980), Fields and Mitchell (1984), and Parnes (1981).4
Social Security purposes rose over the period, with most of the increase
occurring between 1970 and 1980. A retiree's basic monthly benefit, called
the Primary Insurance Amount or PIA, also increased by 39% in nominal terms
due to legislative reforms.'
During the second decade two major alterations were made in the way
Social Security benefits were calculated. First, provisions were made for
automatic adjustments in benefit levels to keep pace with inflation.
Second, there were statutory increases in the multiples applied to earnings
and huge increases in the amount of earnings counted.Finally, in 1977 a
new method of calculating benefits was legislated using a much simpler
formula based on indexed earnings.2 The cumulative effect of all these
changes was a nominal increase of 139%.
The combined effect of these changes in the pension environment can be
illustrated with the help of Table 1. This table presents average net
earnings and Social Security profiles in 1960, 1970 and 1980 using the tax
and Social Security rules in effect at the time. All dollar values are
reported in 1970 dollars for ease of comparison; a discussion of how the
data were created appears in the appendix.
Between 1960 and 1970, the most significant change was a large upward
shift in Social Security benefits both in annual and present value terms.
Annual benefits rose 33% in real terms for retirement at age 62and 28% for
retirement at age 65, while the present value of the real Social Security
1 The PIA is calculated in terms of a percentage of earnings. In 1960 the
PIA equalled 58.85% of the first $110 earned, plus 21.4% of up to $290
additional earnings. By 1970, the formula had been adjusted so that the
PIA equalled 81.83% of the first $110, plus 29.76% of the next $290, plus
27.8l. of the next $150, plus 32.69% of the next $100.
2 In 1980 the PIA equalled 90% of the first $194, plus 35% of the next $977,























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































benefit stream rose 24% and 20% for retirement at ages 62 and 65 respec-
tively. Between 1970 and 1980, Social Security benefit formulas rose 10%
for age 62 retirees, but dropped a bit for those deferring retirement until
age 65. Expected Social Security present value streamsdeclined slightly at
age 62 (10%) and by a great deal (27%) at age 65.This occurred primarily
because the system in 1980 rewarded deferred retirement less than it did
ten years previously. In other words, the slope of the Social Security
present value profile flattened and even became negative over the period
1970 and 1980.
The other significant change during 1970—1980 was the increase in the
permissable mandatory retirement age. This is not evident from Table 1
because any changes in response to this would be expected in private
pension rules. Empirical evidence on pension response to regulatory change
is the subject of discussion in Section 3 of this paper.
2.Predicting Pension Responses
The regulatory changes described above clearly altered the economic
incentives confronting older workers in significant ways over the period
1960—80. By drawing on prior labor supply research, it is possible to
forecast how these budget set changes modified workers' desired retirement
patterns. In turn, contract theory can be used to predict how these new
behavioral outcomes would have elicited changes in the structure of
compensation packages offered to older employees. This section derives
predictions about the likely retirement age changes and consequent pension
changes expected in response to the regulatory reforms of the 1960—80
period. Actual empirical patterns are compared with the predictions in the
next section.7
A. The 1960—1970 Period
As noted in Section 1, the most significant change affecting the
pension environment experienced during the 1960s was the large upward shift
inSocialSecurity benefits generating over 20%larger Social Security
present values for an average worker. Understanding how such a significant
change in older workers' budget sets would affect retirement patterns is
facilitated by the use of an intertemporal labor supply model developed in
Fields and Mitchell (1984). Here the worker's problem Is posed as one
where the individual selects a retirement age to maximize his utility,
which is a function of consumption (C) and leisure during his retirement
years (RET):
U =U(C,KET)where U1, U2 > 0 and U12, U21 < 0. (1)
Two constraints on the individual must be incorporated: First, there is a
time constraint such that the time devoted to leisure plus the time spent
working must not exceed time remaining until death (RETT —R).1
Additionally there is the constraint that lifetime consumption must not
exceed available wealth as of the date the retirement computations are
made,2 plus the present discounted value of expected future income
(PDVY). The PDVY term is composed of three parts in the analysis below:
one part due to (net) labor market earnings over the employed period
1The problem is described in the certainty case for clarity here; the
empirical work below replaces fixed and known life expectancies with
survival probabilities which change with age.
• 2 The empirical analysis below assumes that detailed retirement plans are
made when the worker attains age 60, since evidence suggest that retirement
planning occurs fairly late in life for most workers.8
(PDVE),1 a second portion due to (net) Social Security payments over the
retirement period (PDVSS), and the last part due to (net) private pension
payments from retirement until death (PDVPP).2 These are readily
summarized as follows:3
PDVY (R) =PDVE(R)+PDVPP(R)+PDVSS(R) (2)
where
PDVE (R) =1R E(t) ertdt, E(t) > 0 Vt;
PDVPP KR) R' P(t,R)etdt;
PDVSS (R) R' S(t,R)edt;
and Ryear of retirement, t =yearin question, and 0 =baseyear for
retirement computations (age 60).
All income components are subscripted with R to emphasize the direct
dependence of all present value streams on the worker's retirement age. In
the case of earnings, this dependence is straightforward as the formula
indicates. In the case of pensions and Social Security payments, the
annual benefits themselves vary depending on when the worker leaves his
job. For instance in some private pension plans, early retirees (at 60 or
61) receive a special supplement until they become eligible to file for
Social Security at age 62, whereupon the supplement is reduced to zero.
Alternatively, workers deferring benefits until after age 65 may sometimes
1 We abstract from part—time work or work after retirement from a main job
since these practices were rare for the workers covered by our pension
plans (See Mitchell and Fields, 1984). Post—retirement work has been
examined by Gustman and Steinmeier (1984).
2 Income and payroll taxes are subtracted from all relevant income streams as
explained in the appendix.
Bequests may readily be incorporated in the theoretical model but are
ignored here since our data contain no information on such amounts.9
receivespecial late retirement credits. In general, defined benefit
pension structures are not actuarially neutral, as the empirical work below
will demonstrate.
Solving first order conditions and equating them reveals that the
worker's optimal retirement date is that which sets equal the marginal
utility of additional income gained by working another year, with the
marginal utility of leisure foregone from another year's work. This
optimal retirement age is defined implicitly as follows:
(C RET)[E —s — +TaS(t,R) d ÷T dI ac' RRRR RR R tR' dRRt
dU — (C,RET) — 0 (3)
where R =eT.R* is the optimal retirement age solving equation (1).
Evaluating the effect of increased generosity in Social Security
benefits such as those experienced during the l960s becomes straightforward
in this context. Cast in their simplest form, the benefit changes of the
first decade shifted out older workers' present value streams without
materially affecting their slopes, since levels rose but the rewards for
deferring retirement stayed practically the same. Figure 1 illustrates
this pattern graphically by depicting the tradeoff between years of leisure
foregone (years worked) and increments in income from Social Security
benefits.
As is evident from the Figure, this restructuring of Social Security
would be predicted to have a powerful income effect increasing workers'
demand for leisure at older ages and hence encouraging them to retire
earlier than prior to the reform. In terms of equation 3, this occured
because the rise in benefits lowered the marginal utility of consumptionFigure 1.












from income and raised the marginal utility of leisure. In other words,
raising Social Security benefits as was done during the 1960s induced
workers to retire earlier, holding all else constant.
Given that older workers' desired retirement ages would most likely
have become earlier during the 1960s as a result of the changes in their
budget sets, it remains to ask how compensation structures might have
adapted to the new workforce patterns. In order to do so, it is necessary
to assume that employers would have responded to the legislated changes by
altering their pension structures (if they altered anything), rather than
by changing wage patterns. This seems most reasonable for the relatively
short period under consideration, since past earnings for workers nearing
retirement age would have been fixed and unalterable at that point.'
Employers operating under a long—term contract are posited to equate
workers' lifetime compensation with their lifetime value of marginal
product streams. Using Lazear's (1984) notation, the firm specifies a
retirement age R+ at which lifetime productivity (V(R+)) at least equals
the sum of wages plus pensions:
V(R) =PDVE(R) ÷ PDVP (R'). (4)
When the workers' optimal retirement age R* coincides with the firm's
optimal R+, neither employers nor workers have an incentive to alter the
status quo.
When the pension environment was altered in ways such as described
above, the firm/worker equilibrium would have been disturbed such that
1In the short run, wages for new entrants could react to the policy changes,
and certainly in the longer run, all elements of the compensation package
including wages could be altered. However our focus on older workers and
the relatively short period under consideration in the empirical section
limits our attention to changes in pension profiles alone.12
lifetime productivity no longer equalled lifetime compensation. For
instance, raising Social Security payments during the 1960s would have
induced many workers to select an individually optimal retirement date
(R*_t) earlier than the date which had initially been optimal from both the
fit-rn's and the worker's viewpoint. At that new date, lifetime YMPexceeded
the value of compensation paid by the firm:
v(R*_t) > PDVE (R*_t) ÷ PDVP (R*_t). (5)
Maintaining the assumption that earnings streams for workers nearing
retirement were fixed, the only variable subject to change would have been
the value of the retiree's pension. Of course employers would have
preferred to leave the pension structure unchanged since they would then
receive an unexpected excess of worker output over compensation, as a
result of the reforms in Social Security. On the other hand, employees
would have attempted to equalize lifetime compensation and productivity by
demanding a higher pension value at the new, earlier retirement date R*_t.
Which outcome was more likely depended, in part, on employees' ability
to induce employers to share the windfall gains generated as a result of
the reforms and subsequent change in behavior. Presumably In unionized
firms, workers could have forced some redistribution of these unanticipated
gains, both because of union strength per se and because unionized firms
tend to be larger and therefore more sensitive to reputation costs asso-
ciated with reneging on long—term promises of a contractual nature.' Thus
the increase in Social Security benefits of the 1960s, by inducing workers
to desire earlier retirement, generated an unanticipated surplus of
productivity over lifetime compensation for employers with long—term
1 Azariadis and Stiglitz (1983) review the role of reputation costs in
contract models.13
contracts. Workers most able to capture a portion of the windfall would be
expected to demand higher pension levels at younger retirement ages, so as
to equalize lifetime pay and output. In practice this would also tend to
he accompanied by pension benefit structures providing more income for
retirement at earlier ages, and perhaps less than actuarially fair amounts
for those deferring rtirement. Unorganized employees would have desired
the same changes in pension structures though the degree to which they
could achieve these outcomes would be relatively less.
B. The_1970—1980 Period
During the subsequent ten years, three major regulatory changes
altered older workers budget sets: income and payroll taxes increased
dramatically, Social Security rewards for deferring retirement declined,
and the mandatory retirement age was raised to age 7O How desired
retirement patterns responded to these changes can again be sketched with
the aid of equation 3.
Increased taxes directly reduced earnings available from continued
work by a significant amount.'A reduction in earnings has a theore-
tically ambiguous impact on optimal retirement ages, since the income
effect implies the worker will remain on the job (purchase less leisure)
while the substitution effect suggests more leisure will be consumed and
retirement will occur sooner. Again earlier empirical work has suggested
that on average, people will respond by retiring earlier.
1For example, a 65 year old single worker earning a gross real salary of
$9500 (1970$) would have taken home eleven percent less in the 1980s than
in the l970s due to increased taxes.14
Decreasesin the payoff for deterring retirement under Social Security
wouldlikewisehave theoretically conflicting influences, since the lower
rewards for waiting to retire would imply earlier retirement but workers
facing diminished income opportunities would tend to work longer. If the
substitution effect dominates as above, earlier retirement would be likely
to be the average response. (See Figure 2).
In either of these two circumstances, pension structures would tend to
respond to earlier desired retirement ages as above. Again employers would
14_ 41 U1ILIL LLOHL WULLb 1eV±U, eLLLeL LLU %-I&C L11.LL.LQL,
lessin earnings and pension at that earlier date. The windfall might be
shared in the form of higher annual pension levels and earlier pension
present value peaks in the case of organized workers. Nonunion employees
would have desired the same pension increases but would be less able to
effectuate them.
Predictions derived from an examination of the impact of raising the
mandatory retirement age differ somewhat from those just mentioned. If
there were a case where an employee desired to remain on the job beyond the
original mandatory retirement date set in the long—term contract (say to
lifetime compensation would exceed his value of output:
v(R*÷t) K PDVE (R*+t) +PDVP(R*÷t). (6)
This windfall loss to employers of older workers would tend to be met by
changing the only available instrument: the pension benefit structure. In
particular, employers would attempt to cut costs by lowering the value of
pension benefits directly, and also by shifting to an earlier age the pointFigure 2.
Present Value of Social Security Benefit Streams at




(Age 65) R*_t (Age 60)
Note: See Table 1 and text for construction.
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at which the PDVP profile attained a maximum. Thus pension profiles are
expected to peak at an earlier age as a result of raising the mandatory
retirement age as well as in response to Social Security and tax changes
during the 1970s. However, pension values would be lowered in response to
the change in mandatory retirement, but raised in response to changes in
taxes and Social Security. Which effect dominates is an empirical matter
examined next.
3. The Empirical Findipg
In order to evaluate which of the theoretical predictions are in fact
sustained in empirical analysis, it is necessary to develop information on
pension incentive structures as they changed through time. No data set
exists on private sector pensions which is both longitudinal and suffi-
ciently detailed to provide the necessary insight into benefit structures.
Thus the present research extends earlier work by building on a data file
of detailed benefit formulas for fourteen pension plans described in Fields
and Mitchell (1984).
Our sample was originally selected from a file collected in 1978 by
the U.S. Department of Labor entitled the Benefit Amounts Survey (BAS).
That file was not longitudinal, however, so that an analysis of pensions
through time required a new compilation of company and union pension
documents from the 1950s through 1984. The degree of detail in these
documents enabled us to devise computer algorithms for determining re—tirees' incomes in three different decades: 1960, 1970 and 1980. No more
representative data set with information on the identical plans through
time is now availablei
17
The individual pension plans cannot be identified for confidentiality
reasons. However it is possible to say that the sample includes several
pensions basing benefits primarily on years of service; these pattern plans
are typical of four United Auto Worker (UAW) pensions for which we have
data. Also included are four other unionized firms in transportation,
construction and trade, as well as six nonunion plans including firms in
the service and finance sectors.
Because individual benefit formulas are quite complex, and vary
according to a workers' years of seniority, salary and retirement age,
there is no simple way of summarizing benefit streams available to the
older worker in a given plan.It is thus necessary to compute benefits for
illustrative workers to determine how pension opportunities varied over the
period 1960—80. This was in fact done for each pension plan using sixty
illustrative workers described in the appendix with several possible
combinations of earnings levels, seniority levels, and marital status
groups. In all cases, the perspective taken was a forward—looking one in
1Efforts to match pension plans described in Bankers' Trust data for 1975
and 1980 are described in Lazear (1983). However the formula used to match
these plans though time (which are not identified by name) is subject to a
great deal of error. In addition the pension descriptions in those volumes
are often so terse as to be uninformative about benefit levels as well as
pre— and post—retirement increases. Thus our sample contains more pre-
cisely measured pension specifications for a smaller sample than Lazear's.18
that we sought to model what a worker attaining age 60 would have antici-
pated receiving in financial terms if he retired immediately versus
deferring retirement to alternative dates between age 60 and the firm's
mandatory retirement date.1
The individual contemplating retirement at age 60 would use the
pension rules then in effect at his firm to determine what would be
available if he retired immediately. In addition it would be necessary for
him to develop some notion of how benefits might change if he were to defer
retirement by one year, two years, and so forth. The figures below assume
that workers considered past adjustments in formulating forecasts of how
benefit rules might be expected to change in the future. For instance,
workers in unionized firms could have expected new contracts to incorporate
pension changes similar to those adopted in previous contracts; nonunion
employees could also look to the recent evolution of their own pension
structure in projecting how benefits would change with deferred retire-
ment. Our best estimate of workers' expectations about benefit levels are
thus devised by looking at how pension formulas actually changed during the
decade before the worker turned 60.
An examination of the plans under study reveals that they were altered
surprisingly often over the period under consideration——sometimes as
frequently as three times a decade. These changes took many forms: some
simply raised dollar values associated with retirement at different ages,
while others revamped their benefit structures completely. For instance
one nonunion firm set benefits as a simple percentage of pay in 1960, while
1 For benefit computation purposes below, we used age 70 as the latest likely
retirement age if no mandatory retirement age was given. Virtually no
employee worked beyond that age in the pension plan data file for the
1970s.19
by 1980 It moved to an integrated plan in which Social Security payments
were subtracted from retirees' private pension amounts. At times the
changes were quite subtle: in 1960, one firm designated the "normal"
retirement age as 65 and reduced benefits for early leavers, whereas by
1980 the same firm entirely eliminated the early retirement penalty even
though the formal definition of "normal" retirement was left unchanged.
This overview suggests that it is extremely difficult to obtain a simple
summary measure of pension incentives, and indeed prompts a full consi—
deration of benefit computations over time for the same set of plans to see
exactly how they changed. Most plans raised benefits In response to
inflation, though during the 1970s only 9 of the 14 had benefit Increases
which recouped even half of the benefit erosion due to Inflation. Benefit
increases after retirement were even less generous; only four plans had
benefits rising at one—half the inflation rate and the rest were lower.'
In all cases, pre— and post—retirement increases consistent with actual
experiences were built into the pension value computations.
The data in Table 2 report pension benefit levels across plans for
the 1960, 1970 and 1980 cohorts using single worker tax tables; patterns
for married males are virtually identical.2 Benefit amounts in the top
panel represent annual pension payments (gross and net of taxes) under the
assumption that the worker filed for benefits as soon as eligible. The
second panel reports the net present discounted value of the annual streams
1 These findingsagree In general with the results reported by Clark,
Allen, and Sumner (1983) regarding the degree of inflation protection of
pensions during the l970s.
2 Those figures are available from the authorson request.Table 2.
Net Pension Annual and Present
Value Amounts in 1960, 1970 and 1980-'
(1970$)
If Retirement is at age:
60 61 62 63 64 65
1.Annual First Year Pension Benefits:
1960: Gross $686 770 922 1021 1123 1326
Net 651 728 867 952 1036 1216
1970: Gross 1876 1974 2178 2333 2483 2441
Net 1790 1877 2073 2208 2331 2364
1980: Gross 1989 2189 2207 2360 2483 2590
Net 1841 2006 2043 2163 2255 2383
II. Net Present Discounted Value of Penion Stream (PDVP):
1960: $6684 6998 7862 8018 8073 8755
1970: 17560 17660 18530 18450 18143 18688
1980: 16212 16501 18867 18821 18453 18284
-'Figures presented are for single males; patterns for married males are similar.
'Benef it data provided for ages 60 to 65 only since some plans enforced mandatory
retirement at later ages in 1960 and 1970.
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computed as described in the Appendix, assuming a 2% real discount rate and
the inflation rate in effect when the worker turned age 60 and was evalua-
ting retirement Income options. All figures are in real 1970 dollars.
The overall patterns are consistent with the predictions generated in
Section 2. Between 1960 and 1970, both annual and present value streams of
private pension payments increased in both gross and net terms rather
dramatically——more than doubling and sometimes tripling. A second change
is also evident if one examines the shape of the PDVP profiles: for
retirees in the 1960s, the PDVP stream attained a maximum at age 65
(underlined In the Table) whereas ten years later there simply was not much
difference between the size of the pension stream for retiring at ages 62
and 65. In other words, fot the sample as a whole, pension incentives went
from actively encouraging prolonged work in the l960s, to a far more
neutral pattern between ages 62 and 65 in the 1970's.
In general then, the large upward shift in Social Security benefits
appears to have been reinforced by increases in private pension levels,
particularly at earlier retirement ages. Since these findings conform
remarkably well to the predictions derived in Section 2, it Is at least
plausible to accord some support to the contract theory as described above.
Between 1970 and 1980, a rather different empirical picture emerges.
Annual pension values declined a bit at some retirement ages in real
terms, with roughly similar declines in PIJVP values. This is attributable
in part to the fact that most of the plans did not fully protect benefits
against inflation. In addition, the point at which the PDVP stream peaked
became rather more pronounced In the later year as well, with propor-
tionally larger benefit reductions for those choosing to work beyond age
62.22
Itwill be recalled that two different predictions emerged from
Section 2 regarding anticipated empirical changes. Had the impact of
Social Security and tax reforms dominated, one would have expected to see
benefits rising, reinforcing patterns of the earlier decade. However
benefits were predicted to fall if raising the mandatory retirement age was
more influential. The data indicate that employers slightly reduced
pension benefits and, in many cases, lowered the payoff for workers
retiring at ages other than 62.1 Thus the weight of the evidence so far
would seem to be more compatible with the conclusion that the change in the
mandatory retirement age had the stronger impact on pension benefit
structures 2
Table 3 offers a detailed breakdown of the way pension structures
changed between the l960s and 1980s, by separately identifying those
pensions directly negotiated by union employees (grouped into United Auto
Workers plans and other unions plans), and the remaining non—union plans.
The hypothesis advanced earlier was that during the 1960—70 period,
organized employees might have been better able to obtain both earlier
retirement and a share of the firm's windfall compensation gain due to
earlier retirement, as compared to workers with less negotiating power.
bear out this prediction: between 1960 and 1970, the
benefit levels far more quickly than either of the
other two groups. At the same time, the UAW pension incentives were
1 Our findings thus confirm Lazear's (1983) results on pension changes
occurring between 1975 and 1980 using Bankers' Trust data.
2 It would be useful to show that in the absence of changes in the pension,
workers would have opted to remain employed beyond their firm's initial
mandatory retirement age. However, empirical data on workers covered by
these plans is not available for analysis at this time.
Patterns in Table 3
UAW plans increasedTable 3
Net Pension Present Value Amounts in
1960, 1970 and 1980 for Union and Nonunion Workers-f"
(1970$)
If Retirement is at Age:
60 61 62 63 64 65
Net Present Discounted Value of Pension Stream (PDVP):'
1. UAW Plans:
1960 54 b/12 6987 7194
1970 28132 27480 27051 25676 24333 23761
1980 19015 18208 18547 17745 16719 16067
2. Other Union Plans:
1960 7846 7719 7532 7356 7167 8274
1970 9651 9692 11286 11524 11731 13294
1980 14158 14082 15284 14818 14291 14307
3. Nonunion Plans:
1960 6736 7228 9100 9330 9400 10117
1970 15785 16425 17678 18250 18291 18902
1980 15713 16975 21468 22208 22383 22413
Figures presented are for single males; patterns for married males are simdlar.
-'Benef it data provided forages 60 to 65 only since some plans enforced mandatory
retirement at later ages in 1960 and 1970.
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completely reversed so as to reward most highly those retiring before age
65. By way of contrast, the non—UAW union as well as the non—union groups
experience a far smaller pension benefit increase over the 1960's. There
was also no change in the age—65 pension peak. The difference in these
patterns is consistent with the interpretation that employers outsidethe
strong union sector probably benefited from Social Security changes during
that period, since most did not increase pension benefits as much as the
UAW sector did.
Pension profiles by 1980 had a pronounced peak at age 62, as opposed
to being flat from 62 through 65 as in 1970. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that firms wished to discourage workers who otherwise might have
wished to remain on their jobs beyond that point. Interestingly, Table 3
again reveals some differences between groups of workers: the non—UAW
union plans became more like the UAW set, developing a pension peak at the
early age of 62. Nonunion pension profiles continued to be fairly neutral
from ages 62 to 65.
Table 4 confirms these conclusions in a somewhat different format by
presenting descriptive regressions across hypothetical workers and plans.
The dependent variable is the age at which workers' pension present values
peaked, taking each of the three decades separately and also pooling years.
All explanatory variables in the micro data are dichotomous, taking the
value of 1 if the worker had the characteristic in question, and 0 other-
wise. (See Table 4 for variable descriptions). Coefficients on the year
dummy variables emphasize the point that a tremendous turnaround in pension
incentives was experienced between 1960 and 1970, moving from a system
which generally encouraged work at later ages, to one In which deferred
retirement was actively penalized in many cases. That the same remainedTable 4. 25
Correlates of Age When Pension Present Value Peaks
(N =840)





UAW Union Q39** _2.90** _2.61**
(3.40) (19.46) (18.43) (19.56)
Other Union _Q.95** 0.01 _0.79** _0.58**
(8.20) (0.08) (5.56) (6.59)
Married 0.12 0.17 0.05** 0.11
(1.26) (1.39) (18.43) (1.58)
Minimum Wage 0.64** 0.40** —0.20 _0.41**
(5.15) (2.51) (1.34) (4.44)
Tax Max —0.17 0.11 0.07 0.00
(1.41) (0.70) (0.43) (0.00)
Low Seniority 0.12 l.28** 0.78** O.73**
(1.03) (8.45) (5.42) (8.20)
High Seniority —0,10 —0.21 _0.33** _0.2l**
(0.85) (1.37) (2.26) (2.38)
R2 .15 .41 .33 .24
Variable Descriptions:
Year —1970or 1980: Variable equals 1 if observation drawn from that year, 0 other-
wise (1960 is omitted category).
UAW Union, Other Union: Variableequals 1 if observation is from a UAW—negotiated pension
plan or a plan negotiated with some other (non—UAW) union, re-
spectively, 0 otherwise. (Nonunion is omitted category).
Married: Variable equals 1 if the observation was drawn from the sample
of married workers, 0 otherwise (Single is omitted category).
Minimum Wage, Tax Max: Variable equals 1 if the worker's earnings profile was equal to
the minimum wage or the Social Security taxable maximum over his
lifetime, respectively, 0 otherwise (Average LRHS earnings is
omitted category).
Low or HighSeniority: Variable equal to 1 if the worker's seniority was equal to:





* t > 1.6526
true in 1980 is evident form the 1980—year dummy, though the effect is
attenuated slightly as compared to 1970. The regression analysis also
supports the finding that workers subject to pensions negotiated by the UAW
had significantly earlier retirement incentives, even controlling on
pension bonuses for seniority and pay.
A direct method of examining the effect of mandatory retirement
reforms on pension structures is also available. Table 5 presents an
analysis of changes in the age at which the pension benefit structures
peaked, comparing the 1970 benefit structure with that in 1980. Under the
hypothesis that lifting the mandatory retirement age induced employers to
alter pension incentive patterns, one would expect to observe that the PDVP
result. This is exactly what the pooled data show. Firms that initially
imposed mandatory retirement ages prior to age 70 were also those which
reduced the age at which their pension benefit stream peaked between 1970
and 1980, after they were forced to raise their mandatory retirement ages.
Further, the pattern is the same irrespective of whether the firms had
initially specified mandatory retirement at age 65 or at some later age,
and does not seem sensitive to the inclusion of other control variables.
Finally, pension levels changed between 1970 and 1980 in rather
interesting ways. Benefits fell for the UAW workers, a finding compatible
with the conclusion that this group was more strongly affected by the ADEA
reforms. The other pension plan values rose, in contrast, consistent with
a stronger response to changes in taxes and Social Security rules.'
1Regression results (available on request) confirm that pension levels fell
inrealterms between 1970 and 1980, holding constant union status,
earnings levels. taxes. marital status, and seniority.Table 5.




Change in Age at which PDVP Peaks
(1970 to 1980)
(1) (2)
Mand. Ret. (ever) _O.35** —
(2.36)
Mand. Ret. (at 65) —
(2.91)
UAW union _0.23* _0.38**
(1.91) (3.09)




Minimum Wage —0.20 —0.20
(1.55) (1.56)
Tax Max 0.05 0.05
(0.36) (0.36)
Low Seniority O.50** Q.50**
(4.12) (4.13)




t statistics in parentheses
** t > 1.96
* t > 1.65
Variable Descriptions:
See text and notes to Table 4.
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4.conclusions
The question motivating this analysis was whether private pension
systems react in predictable ways to changes in their environment, where by
"predictable" we mean in accordance with contract theory. The particular
changes examined here include innovations in taxes, Social Security and
mandatory retirement regulations over the period 1960—1980. Our findings
indicate that pensions did infact appear to behave in ways consistent with
contract theory, in that benefit levels and patterns of benefit incentives
changed over time in ways that agreed with the model's predictions.
The most significant changes observed in our sample of fourteen
pension plans were those occurring during the 1960—70 period. It was
argued that Social Security reforms encouraged employees to opt for earlier
retirement, and in many cases private pension offerings adapted to accom-
modate these new retirement patterns. Union plans, especially those
negotiated by the United Auto Workers, appeared to be especially successful
in restructuring pension incentives to fit workers' changing behavior.
The 1970—80 period saw two regulatory policies with theoretically
different effects: a real reduction in the value of Social Security
payments for early retirees, and the passage of the ADEA amendment raising
the age at which firms could require mandatory retirement. While few
workers in fact remained on the job long enough to be constrained by
mandatory retirement rules, it is still reasonable to argue that firms
altered their pension patterns in anticipation of changes in worker
behavior. Some support for this proposition was detected, in that pensions28
requiring mandatory retirement during the 1960s and 1970s altered their
benefit incentives by 1980 so as to encourage earlier retirement and UAW
plans actually reduced the value of pension benefits between 1970 and 1980.
It must be emphasized that this analysis is based on a small sample of
pension plans so that the results must be replicated elsewhere before they
can be generalized. On the other hand there is certainly sufficient
evidence to indicate that a longitudinal study of pension agreements is a
fruitful method of uncovering empirical evidence on long—term contractual
arrangements between workers and firms. In addition it seems clear that
private pension systems do respond in predictable ways to changes in the
economic and regulatory environment in which they operate. This last point
is often overlooked in policy studies investigating the impact of Social
Security reform, tax changes, and other labor market retirement income
innovations. Future research on such policy issues should begin to acknow—
ledge the potential for pension responses to changes in their environment,
using contract theory as a base.29
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Sixty different illustrative workers were developed for the purpose
nf rnmn,it4 nithanaffltFlanrocrannrt-crlIn f-ha tovf- •c-ivt—'.rIcf-ha nrnrl,,rt- nf
five pay profiles, six tenure patterns, and two marital status groups. An
intermediate pay trajectory utilized the average annual earnings for male
employees in the Social Security Administration's Longitudinal Retirement
History Survey (LRHS) covered by a pension plan.1In addition two other
workers were devised at 80% and 135 of the LRHS average providing a
reasonable salary range about the mean.2
This procedure generates a group of illustrative workers reaching age
60 as of 1970. These were used in benefit computations for the decade of
the l970s. It was also necessary to specify earnings profiles for cohorts
reaching age 60 in 1960 and 1980 as well. Nominal earnings streams for the
1 The sample selection criteria for LRHS workers are described In Fields and
Mitchell (1984). Imputed earnings rather than actual earnings were
employed so as to avoid possible sample selection bias that might arise if
earnings from non—retirees alone were used.
2 Analysis of the workers covered by the 14 plans In the MS sample indicates
that their earnings fell within the salary range set by the LRIIS workers.31
three LRFIS workers were thus deflated to 1960 values and inflated to 1980
values using the CPI. This holds constant real earnings by age in the
three decades so as to better be able to compare resultant benefit patterns
through time.
In order to assess whether the benefit figures generated were specific
to LRIIS earners, we also devised two additional earnings streams. A low
earnings worker was devised by attributing to him for each year of work the
statutory minimum wage (times 2000 hours of work per year), and a high wage
worker was one who always earned a salary placing him at the taxable
earnings ceiling for the purposes of Social Security taxation. The text
refers to averages across all six earnings profiles, since these results
proved sufficiently similar to the underlying individual patterns so as not
to warrant separate mention.
The six seniority profiles were measured in terms of the tenure
accumulated as of age 60: 10, 20 and 30 years (groupings commonly seen in
retirement data), as well as 15, 22 and 25 years representing the minimum,
mean and maximum years of seniority found in earlier research using
retirees from the 14 plans during the 1970s. Finally, these thirty
pay—tenure combinations became 60 by considering both a single and a
married worker for each case.
2. Taxes
lEn order to determine net income values for alternative retirement
ages, it was necessary to deduct both payroll and income taxes from
employment earnings and retirement income. Actual tax schedules were used
until the worker attained age 60; thereafter tax forecasts were assumed to
be based on changes in the formulas experienced during the workers'32
previous ten years. This set of computations produced net annual earnings
streams for the illustrative workers had they remained on the job, as well
as net pension and Social Security payments if instead they had retired at
alternative points. Net income streams were computed for both single and
married workers (assuming standard deductions) to see whether changing
income and payroll taxes altered retirement incentives differentially by
marital status through time. The text refers to results for single workers
since those for married taxpayers are qualitatively similar.
3.Social S e cBeits
Workers' expectations about Social Security benefits available for
immediate retirement were assumed to be based on the rules in effect at the
beginning of the planning period; anticipated future Social Security
changes incorporated pre— and post—retirement increases consistent with
those experienced during the decade prior to that when the worker turned
age 60. Throughout its history, Social Security has been constantly
redesigned by Congress: for instance, a worker retiring in 1960 or even in
1970 would reasonably have expected real Social Security payments to remain
constant or even rise somewhat after retirement since benefits had done
just that throughout the previous decades. Since the mid—1970s, of course,
benefits have been formally indexed. These assumptions were incorporated
in the computations for both married and single workers, assuming that
married workers' spouses filed for one—half of their husbands' benefits.33
4. Present Value Computations
All benefit and earnings present values incorporate a 2% real discount
rate and survival probabilities based on life tables specific to each
cohort.